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ABSTRACT
Smartphones with Google’s Android operating system are becoming more and more popular
each year, and with this increased user base, comes increased opportunities to collect more of
these users’ private data. There have been several instances of malware being made available
via the Google Play Store, which is one of the predominant means for users to download
applications. One effective way of collecting users’ private data is by using Android Spyware.
In this paper, we conduct a forensic analysis of a malicious Android spyware application and
present our findings. We also highlight what information the application accesses and what
it does with that information. We then provide our findings on how Google’s Play Protect
service handles this spyware application. Lastly, we offer a simple framework that forensic
investigators can follow for performing mobile application analysis.
Keywords: Android, Malware, Mobile Forensics, Mobile Security, Spyware Analysis, Play
Protect.

1.

INTRODUCTION

The Android Operating System (OS) is the
most used mobile OS in the world, accounting for 76.61% of the global market share (?,
?). This makes it an ideal target for cybercriminals who make their living stealing and
selling persons’ Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Malicious applications (apps)
that make it possible for attackers to obtain
such PII are called Spyware.
Google has put several measures in place
c 2019 ADFSL

to protect its users from malicious apps, including their more recent security implementation, the Play Protect service (?, ?). Play
Protect is advertised as an always on feature that provides protection against malicious applications on devices through machine learning, provides a means of locating
a misplaced device through Find My Device,
and provides secure Internet browsing with
Safe Browsing protection in Chrome (?, ?).
Unfortunately, even with being in operation for well over a year, there have been inPage 1
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stances where the Play Protect service was
unable to detect and remove rogue apps before they were downloaded and used by millions of unsuspecting users (?, ?)(?, ?) from
the Play Store.
This paper aims to provide an analysis
of one such Spyware that was able to bypass Google’s Play Protect service and also
present an answer to two integral questions:
1. What does the Spyware do?
2. How does the Spyware accomplish what
it does?
We believe that this information would
be beneficial to other Android security researchers as it would highlight some app behaviors that indicate said app may be malicious.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives background information on the topic of Android Spyware detection. Section 3 specifies the experiment
setup that was followed. Our findings are
presented in Section 4 while Section 5 offers
a simple framework for performing application analysis. Section 6 concludes our paper.

2.

RELATED WORK

Within recent years, there have been several
spyware attacks plaguing Android devices.
Some of these attacks occurred in the wild
(?, ?) and (?, ?), while others were developed
specifically to shed light on the need for improved security within the Android platform
(?, ?).
Abualola et al. (?, ?) developed a Trojan
Spyware that leveraged the capabilities of
Android’s NotificationListener service. The
malicious app was advertised as an SMS
Backup app. However, the app came with
a backdoor which allowed it to forward notification content from WhatsApp, Facebook
Messenger, BBM and SMS to the attacker’s
Page 2

email. The app was able to accomplish this
with the use of two permissions: “Notification Access” and “Internet”.
In addition to researcher-made spyware,
there have been real-world spyware attacks
perpetrated via the Google Play Store. In
2017, there were two such attacks. A rogue
developer, who seemingly bore the same
name as the legitimate company, WhatsApp
Inc., was able to successfully upload a fake
WhatsApp app, titled “Update WhatsApp
Messenger” (?, ?). This fake app was downloaded over one million times despite only
being an ad-loaded wrapper with Internet
access permission. Once installed, the app
would download another apk, called whatsapp.apk. Interestingly, this app was not
first detected by Google’s Play Protect service.
However, Play Protect did discover the deceptive Tizi spyware (?, ?). Tizi is described
as a full-featured Android backdoor that can
gain root access on affected devices in order
to steal users’ PII. This PII may include data
from popular social media apps like WhatsApp, Facebook, Twitter, etc., as well as
SMS messages. In the event Tizi is unable
to root the affected device, it still attempts
to obtain sensitive data through the use of
high level permissions the user would have
granted.
There have been several malware detection techniques put forth; below we highlight
five (5):

2.1

Behavior Based

Multi-Level Anomaly Detection for Android
Malware (MADAM) (?, ?) was designed as a
multi-level and behavior-based malware detection tool for Android. MADAM’s detection ability relies on analyzing five groups
of features from four levels of abstraction:
kernel-level, application-level, user-level and
package-level. These features pass through
a Signature-based detector and a Behaviorc 2019 ADFSL
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based detector before a decision is made on
whether the app is malicious and should be
removed. MADAM prides itself on being
able to detect several classes of malware, including spyware. It also boasts a high detection rate of 96.9% and negligible performance overhead. However, this tool requires
a rooted device to perform.

2.2

Taint Analysis

Rathi and Jindal (?, ?) define taint analysis
as the analysis of an application and the presentation of potentially malicious data flows.
With this in mind, these authors developed
the DroidMark tool which is capable of detecting Android malware with 96.88% accuracy. DroidMark made use of taint analysis
through the use of FlowDroid. This first step
is able to detect sensitive data flows within
Android applications by reverse engineering
the app’s APK file. DroidMark’s second step
identifies sources and sinks through the use
of the SuSI framework. The third step uses
deep learning to classify apps as malicious
or safe through the use of Bayesian Networks. DroidMark is capable of performing
real-time analysis on Android systems.

2.3

Network Traffic Analysis

Malik and Kaushal (?, ?) proposed an alternative method of detection, focused on analyzing apps’ network traffic, specifically their
Domain Name Server (DNS) queries and the
type of information being transmitted to a
remote server. Their approach, titled CREDROID, was able to successfully detect malicious apps and determine what PII was
being transmitted to questionable remote
servers. CREDROID was tested manually
and was unable to identify malicious apps
which did not generate network traffic.
Ren et al. (?, ?) also focused on apps’ network traffic to determine potential PII leaks.
They developed a cross-platform system, titled ReCon, which uses machine learning, to
c 2019 ADFSL
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offer its users a means of controlling those
PII leaks. ReCon used a C4.5 Decision
Tree to handle classification of network traffic that produce PII leaks. ReCon’s accuracy
was most desirable at 99%. From their experiments, it was found that the top three
(3) most leaked PIIs were DeviceID, Location and Credentials. The authors also noted
that these credentials were being transmitted in plaintext.

2.4

Hybrid

Kaur and Sharma (?, ?) utilized a hybrid approach to detect spyware and improve users’
privacy. Their detection frameworks analyses apps based on the app’s Description,
Interface Layout and Source Code. When
an app is installed or updated, the .apk
file for that app is reverse engineered and
its permissions are extracted from its AndroidManifest.xml file. These permissions
are checked against the app’s description and
source code, to ensure only required permissions are being requested. This approach
was able to achieve better detection rates
than popular antiviruses like McAfee, Avast
and AVG

2.5

Machine Learning

Wang et al. (?, ?) re-purposed the XGBoost
model to detect Android malware. Their detection system consisted of static analysis of
both benign and malicious app .apk files to
extract permission and API call features and
the use of a Random-Forest Feature Selection model to reduce the feature set. They
also based their classification accuracies on
using select features, higher weighted features and various combinations of both permission features and API call features. This
detection system was able to outperform or
match the Support Vector Machine model as
it was able to obtain high accuracy and reduced training time.
Mahindru and Singh (?, ?) also utilized
Page 3
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machine learning in order to successfully detect Android malware. However, instead of
using one classifier, they tested with five.
Their method consisted of three phases. In
the first phase, they would collect the .apk’s
for several Android apps. The second phase
included a dynamic analysis of the .apks and
the extraction of the permissions being requested by each app. The last phase saw
the execution of five machine learning algorithms, as they classify each app as malware or benign depending on the permissions extracted. They achieved highest accuracy of 99.7%, using the Simple Logistic
algorithm when it was trained using 70% of
their dataset.

Figure 1. A snippet of the AndroidManifest.xml file

4.
3.

EXPERIMENTAL
SETUP

For
our
malware
analysis
experiment, we opted to investigate the Android.Spy.277.origin malware family. We
obtained a sample of the malware from
GitHub (?, ?). It was downloaded as a File
type and had to be extracted to obtain the
AndroidManifest.xml and classes.dex files.
The classes.dex file was then converted to
its corresponding classes.jar file, using the
dex2jar tool. Analysis of the .jar file was
done using the JD-GUI application.
All experiments were done on a Windows
10 system. We chose to use Android Studio
version 3.1.3 to conduct our experiment on
an Android Virtual Device. This device took
the form of a Nexus S phone running Android 5.0 Lollipop (API 21). After the malware app was installed on the emulator, we
used Wireshark version v2.6.1-0-g860a78b3,
to capture the network traffic of the device
while the app was active and while we performed some manipulations.
Page 4

SPYWARE
ANALYSIS

In this section, we present our observations
and findings having analyzed the application’s Manifest file, source code, installation
and execution on an Android device.

4.1 A look at the
AndroidManifest.xml file
After performing an analysis of the manifest
file (see Figure 1), several interesting points
were found.
1. Package name was identified as
com.inoty.os with displayed version
1.3.0.1. The minSdkVersion for the app
is 5.0 while the targetSdkVersion is 21.
The package being used is
net.suckga.inoty2.
2. Permissions: the app requests several seemingly benign permissions, if
considered on their own, such as
Receive, System Alert Window, Access Fine Location,
Access Network State, etc. However,
when these permissions are considered
c 2019 ADFSL
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4.3

Manipulations made while
the app was active
(sending texts, etc.)

together, they can be used for nefarious
reasons. For example, these permissions
can allow a malicious app to capture
incoming messages and transmit them,
along with the device’s location at the
time, over a network. These and some
other possibly harmful permissions are
identified and briefly explained in Table
1.
3. Activities, Services, Receivers and
Content-Filters: Some of the more
important ones will be examined in
Section 4.5 below.

In order to test the functionality of the Notify Ios app, we enabled both the Accessibility and Notification services and then
performed some activities to create notifications on the device. We sent text messages
using the default Messages app and emails
using the Gmail service. Figure 3c shows
previously received notifications while Figure 3d shows an incoming notification from
the Messages app.

4.4
4.2

An Initial Look at the
App’s Behavior

Installing the .apk file was as simple as dragging and dropping it onto the emulator’s
screen. After the app was installed it was
presented as an app named “Notify Ios” as
shown in Figure 2a. When the app is
launched, the first screen, depicted in Figure
2b offers several personalization options as
well as a means of enabling the app. When
the “Enable Notify Ios” option is selected,
the user is presented with two services that
could be turned on: Accessibility and Notifications. This is shown in Figure 2c.
When the user chooses the Accessibility option, they are taken to the Accessibility Settings where they will be able to turn on “Notify Ios”. Once enabled, the user is told what
privilege the app requires and asked for confirmation, as shown in Figure 2d. When the
user chooses the Notifications option and enables the service, they are presented with a
confirmation screen informing them of what
access privileges the service will now have,
as shown in Figure 3a. When the user enables both the accessibility and notification
services, the app takes over the status bar
(becomes the status bar) as shown in Figure
3b.
c 2019 ADFSL

Network Analysis Process

For us to determine whether the app was doing anything nefarious, we decided to capture the phone’s network traffic while the
app was active. We discovered that every
time the app was opened, it sent a GET request with some of the user’s private data
to an IP address (204.11.56.48). We determined that this IP address was malicious
and was based in the British Virgin Islands.
Some information this app transmitted included the device’s model, the Operating
System version, the phone’s IMEI number,
the email address connected to the Google
account on the device, the device’s MAC address, the current carrier, whether the device
is rooted or not, the country location, etc.,
as shown in Figure 4. When both services
were enabled, the app sent another GET request with the same information to the same
IP address. However, this time it included a
list of all the currently installed packages on
the device, as shown in Figure 5.

4.5

A look at the classes.jar
file

When the classes.jar file was opened with
JD-GUI, we were presented with seven packages, each with several sub-packages which
in turn contained several class files. The
Page 5
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Table 1. Permissions the Notify Ios Application Requests
Permission

Details

android.permission.SYSTEM ALERT WINDOW

Allows an application to create windows that are shown on top of
all other apps.

android.permission.ACCESS WIFI STATE

Allows applications to access information about Wi-Fi networks.

android.permission.ACCESS NETWORK STATE

Allows applications to access information about networks.

android.permission.READ CALENDAR

Allows an application to read the user’s calendar data.

android.permission.ACCESS FINE LOCATION

Allows an app to access the device’s precise location.

android.permission.BLUETOOTH

Allows applications to connect to paired Bluetooth devices.

android.permission.WAKE LOCK

Allows using PowerManager WakeLocks to keep processor from
sleeping or screen from dimming.

android.permission.EXPAND STATUS BAR

Allows an application to expand or collapse the status bar.

android.permission.READ PHONE STATE

Allows read only access to the features of the phone, including the
phone number of the device, current cellular network information,
the status of any ongoing calls, and a list of any Phone Accounts
registered on the device.

android.permission.INTERNET

Allows applications to open network sockets.

android.permission.GET ACCOUNTS

Allows access to the list of accounts in the Accounts Service.

com.android.launcher.permission.INSTALL SHORTCUT

Allows an application to install a shortcut in Launcher.

android.permission.WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE

Allows an application to write to external storage.

com.inoty.os.permission.C2D MESSAGE

Only this application can receive the messages and registration
result.

com.google.android.c2dm.permission.RECEIVE

This app has permission to register and receive messages.

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

Figure 2. Screenshots of the Notify Ios app
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(a)

(b)
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(c)

(d)

Figure 3. Screenshots of the Notify Ios app
most interesting packages were found to be
net.suckga.inoty2 and com.sweet.rangermob.
The important classes and methods that
were responsible for collecting and transmitting identifiable information about the device and user are highlighted below:
1. net.suckga.inoty2.preferences.PreferencesActivity:
It is the first class that runs when the
app is launched by pressing its icon.
2. com.sweet.rangermob.helper.e.a(this.b):
This method determines if there is an
active internet connection. In such
case,
the com.sweet.rangermob.a()
method is started.

Figure 4. Screenshot of PII data

3. com.sweet.rangermob.a(): This method
collects identifying information about
the device and user which is subsequently transmitted to the rogue IP address. This information is stored in a
variable called localArrayList.
4. RootUtil.a(): It looks for superuser access (determines if phone is rooted).
If the device is rooted, collects several other pieces of information, including whether the device has Google Play

c 2019 ADFSL
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Figure 5. List of all installed applications
Store installed, whether there is an active device admin, etc., and adds this
information to the localArrayList variable.
5. paramAnonymousVarArgs = URLEncodedUtils.format
(localArrayList, “utf-8”): converts the
localArrayList to a URL.

class, there is a method that handles
collecting and sending the device and
user information, in addition to a list of
all the installed packages on the device,
to the rogue IP address. This method
closely resembles the one that runs
every time the app is opened.

4.6

Interesting Findings

6. j.a() + paramAnonymousVarArgs:
This builds the website’s URL and
concatenates it with the Encoded URL
from localArrayList with help from the
com.sweet.rangermob.helper.c class.

In an attempt to determine whether or
not this app would be flagged by Google’s
Play Protect service, we attempted to install
the Notify Ios app on a physical Samsung
Galaxy S5 device running Android 6.0. The
device was set to allow installation of apps
7. com.sweet.rangermob.helper.c:
This
from third parties. We performed this instalclass contains variables used to build
lation on three separate occasions because
the HTTP GET request and the
the Play Protect service detects malware usdomain website.
ing machine learning techniques. This will
show us whether those techniques are effi8. paramAnonymousVarArgs=com.sweet.rangermob.
cient against such malware as Notify Ios.
helper.b.b(j.a() + paramAnonymousVarArgs): This passes the completed
URL string to be created in the HTTP
GET request.
9. Within
the
com.sweet.rangermob.xser.RangerSer
Page 8

4.6.1

July 28th, 2018

We copied the .apk file onto the device
and was able to successfully install the app.
When Play Protect scanned all the apps on
the device, none were flagged as suspicious.
c 2019 ADFSL
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Figure 6. Screenshot of Play Protect service
blocking the installation of Noty Ios
4.6.2

Oct 12th, 2018

We again copied the .apk file onto the device
and attempted to install the app. However,
the Play Protect service immediately flagged
the app as suspicious, as shown in Figure 6.
4.6.3

Oct 14th, 2018

We tried one last time to install the app on
the device, however this time there was no
Play Protect warning and the app simply did
not install, as shown in Figure 7.
From these occurrences, we believe that
the Play Protect service learned from our
first installation of the Notify Ios app and
now is able to block any installation of the
app on devices.

5. GUIDELINES FOR
MOBILE APPLICATION
ANALYSIS
Application analysis is a multi-part process
if we are to obtain as much information as
possible about an app’s workings. In this
section, we provide a brief guideline that investigators can follow should they need to do
application analysis.
c 2019 ADFSL
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Figure 7. Screenshot of Noty Ios app refusing to be installed.
1. Static Analysis: Be sure to investigate the source code and app manifest
files, looking for suspicious implementations and unnecessary permission requests that do not fit the described use
of the app. This step can be extremely
cumbersome should the app developer
obfuscate the source code, specifically
class, method and variable names.
2. Dynamic Analysis: Static analysis alone
tends to be insufficient for determining
exactly what an app is doing. Once you
have an idea of what the app is doing
from the static analysis, be sure to install the app on a clean device and run
it. This way, you can interact with the
app, manipulate various features and
note its effects on the device.
3. Network Analysis: Many apps, especially spyware apps, use network features and chances are if you suspect the
app is doing something nefarious after
doing static and dynamic analysis, the
app may be communicating with a malicious, remote server. You should make
network analysis a step during your dynamic analysis. Using a network sniffer
Page 9
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like Wireshark could allow you to ascertain what communications the app
is doing while it’s running on a device.
This includes determining what information the app is transmitting and to
whom that data is going to.
After performing each of these, you should
have a fairly comprehensive understanding
of what the app does and how its features
are implemented.

6.

CONCLUSION

Android smartphones are widely used, and
their users require protection from nefarious
individuals set on obtaining these users’ PII.
Unfortunately, it is possible for some apps
to covertly collect user’s PII and transmitted
that data to unauthorized persons.
After our analysis of the Notify Ios malicious app, we determined that various pieces
of users’ PII were being transmitted to an
unauthorized location. We also combed
through the source code to identify exactly
how this was being accomplished and quickly
found that the app developer relied heavily
on obfuscation of their code to mask their
ill intent. We also tested the capacity of
Google’s Play Protect service to detect this
malicious app and was able to prove that
the service initially failed to detect the app.
However, it was able to learn and flag the
app on subsequent installations.
For future work, we intend to develop our
own malicious spyware app in an attempt to
successfully avoid detection by the Play Protect service. In doing so, we aim to identify
certain malicious characteristics the service
is still incapable of detecting as well as specific vulnerabilities the service is still susceptible to.
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